Abstract-For future application of automated vehicles in public traffic, ensuring functional safety is essential. In this context, a hazard analysis and risk assessment is an important input for designing functionally vehicle automation systems. In this contribution, we present a detailed hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) according to the ISO 26262 standard for a specific Level 4 application, namely an unmanned protective vehicle operated without human supervision for motorway hard shoulder roadworks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The automation of the driving task is probably the most challenging field of research in the automotive context. Level 4 and Level 5 systems -according to the definition of SAE [1] -combine the unlimited set of operational scenarios encountered in public traffic with the absence of human supervision. This implies highest demands regarding functional safety throughout the development of these systems. Thus, the applicability of the ISO 26262 standard [2] -the most recent standard for designing safety-relevant electronic systems in the automotive context -must be examined.
Following the ISO 26262 standard, a hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA) is required in order to determine the criticality of the system under consideration. The results of the HARA strongly influence the efforts to be undertaken in the subsequent development steps for ensuring functional safety. Normally, the results of HARAs are not published and thus cannot be discussed in the scientific community due to reasons of non-disclosure. This also applies to the field of vehicle automation.
However, exceptionally high demands regarding system implementation and its safety result from the missing human supervision. Hence, in-depth discussions about functional safety are crucial before deploying automated vehicles in public traffic. In this contribution, we present the complete results of a HARA conducted for a specific Level 4 application. The paper structures as follows: We introduce the project aFAS and the functionality to be implemented in the project in Section II. In Section III, we define relevant terms, describe the HARA approach, and highlight important *The project aFAS is partially funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology (BMWi). The project consortium consists of MAN (consortium leader), ZF TRW, WABCO, Bosch Automotive Steering, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Hochschule Karlsruhe, Hessen Mobil -Road and Traffic Management, and BASt -Federal Highway Research Institute. We would like to thank our partners and colleagues for their support of our work as well as the reviewers for the high quality review. 
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION & PROJECT CONTEXT
The project aFAS 2 aims at developing an unmanned operation of a protective vehicle (AFA 3 ) on the hard shoulder of highways in Germany, cf. [3] . The vehicle is operated without supervision on hard shoulders only and with low speed of up to 12 km/h. The automated operation consists of three operating modes complemented by the Manual Mode which comprises the normal operation of the AFA with a human driver. Safe Halt serves as initial operating mode as well as for switching between Follow Mode and Coupled Mode. Furthermore, Safe Halt is activated if the system leaves functional system boundaries. In Follow Mode, the AFA follows the leading vehicle, which conducts the actual work such as cleaning the hard shoulder, in a defined distance of about 90 m. To follow the leading vehicle and to stay on the hard shoulder, the AFA perceives the leading vehicle as well as lane markings of the hard shoulder by environment sensors. In Coupled Mode, the AFA follows the leading vehicle in close distance of about 10 m in order to pass acceleration and deceleration lanes. This is primarily realized through motion data of the leading vehicle. For transmitting system states and commands (e. g. changes of operating modes), the vehicles communicate via radio.
For the HARA presented in the following (cf. Section III), we concentrated on the parts that are specific for the automated operation in order to reduce the complexity that arises when considering the entire vehicle. The considered functionality is summarized in terms of the item 4 called AFA Logic. However, for unmanned operation additional elements are required, namely drivetrain, brakes, steering and environment perception. These elements are connected with the AFA Logic as depicted in Fig. 1 . Hence, safety requirements can be inherited between connected elements.
III. HAZARD ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT A. Terminology
A major contribution of the ISO 26262 standard is the definition of more than 100 terms related to functional safety of automotive electric/electronic systems. Yet, some terms must be further clarified for automated driving. In the context of the HARA, the terms hazard, hazardous event, operational situation, and malfunctioning behavior are the most common terms encountered. The term hazard [2, 1.57] is defined as "potential source of harm", which is consistent to other definitions in safety engineering, e. g. [4] , [5] . The definition used in the ISO 26262 standard specifies that a hazard is caused by malfunctioning behavior. Malfunctioning behavior itself is either caused by failures or unintended behavior of the system [2, 1.73]. Hence, the definitions of hazard and malfunctioning behavior are applicable for automated driving.
Furthermore, combining operational situation and hazard yields a hazardous event [2, 1.59] . In contrast to hazard and malfunctioning behavior, the ISO 26262 standard's definitions of the terms operational situation and hazardous event are vague with respect to automated driving. A similar vagueness can be found in [4] and [5] . An operational situation is defined as "scenario that can occur during a vehicle's life" [2, 1.83], equaling the terms situation and scenario. However, both terms -together with the term scene -are widely used in the context of automated driving and must be distinguished from each other according to Ulbrich et al. [6] , who present a comprehensive literature review regarding these terms. Ulbrich et al. define and substantiate a scene as an all-encompassing snapshot of an environment together with the self-representation of all actors and observers contained (objective scene). In the real world, a scene is always subjective for each observer. A situation is derived from the subjective scene perceived by a traffic participant. It contains all necessary premises to derive suitable driving decisions. A scenario is the temporal concatenation of related scenes. Hence, we utilize the term operational scenario in preference to operational situation in the following since an objective exterior view is what is required for conducting a HARA.
The vagueness of the term hazardous event results from the linguistic ambiguity of the term event. This ambiguity is not resolved in the ISO 26262 standard. Event either addresses a period of time or -in a physical/technical sense -a point of time [7] . In engineering, one would consider the latter as intended meaning, yet the temporal interpretation is meant by the ISO 26262 standard in our understanding. What is actually required for obtaining a classification of safety criticality, is an operational scenario combined with a hazard. Thus, we utilize the term hazardous scenario in preference to hazardous event in the following.
B. Approach
For conducting a HARA, a linear reference process is illustrated in the ISO 26262 standard [2, Part 3] , which rather addresses the interdependencies of single steps than necessary iterations to reach completeness. Warg et al. [8] describe an iterative process for developing HARAs in the context of automated driving. The process we applied in regard to the AFA Logic is similar to the approach proposed by Warg et al. and is depicted in Fig. 2 . Yet, our approach differs from the approach of Warg et al. in certain aspects and extends it as well: While Warg et al. take a preliminary feature description as initial input resulting in an item definition during the process, our process input is a well advanced item definition.
Furthermore, we introduce two loops instead of one for refining the work products. Effects of both loops on the AFA Logic are described in the following subsection. The item refinement -comparable to the function refinement of Warg et al. [8] -describes extending or (in most cases) narrowing the functional range of the item under consideration. By this means, the merely functional consideration of the item according to the ISO 26262 standard is supplemented by considering technical feasibility, e. g. due to limited project resources or not yet available technology. In contrast, the safety refinement does not affect the functional range. Rather, it aims at refining the determined hazardous scenarios in order to enable technically realizable safety concepts through reaching more precise and definite safety goals. The safety refinement is comparable to the procedure to reach completeness of HARAs of Johansson [9] .
Apart from refinement, each iteration loop consists of six steps. In the first step, functionalities are extracted from the item definition. Subsequently, potential malfunctioning behavior and related hazards are derived in the second and third step, respectively. The combination of hazards and operational scenarios derived from the item definition then yields the hazardous scenarios in the fourth step. Determining Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASILs) and safety goals are the fifth and the sixth step in Fig. 2 , which are strongly linked.
C. Results
We developed the HARA together with experts from the industrial members of the aFAS consortium 1 , in iterative group meetings. As mentioned, the complete results can be found in the Appendix. In the following, we highlight selected results that affect functional range, environment perception, human machine interface (HMI), and user interaction, as well as central control logic. Table I presents 
SG01
Unintended and not permitted operating mode change must be prevented.
SG02
Intended and permitted operating mode change must be ensured.
SG07
Display of actual operating mode in HMI must be ensured.
Manual Mode SG04
Unintended anti-lock brake actuation must be prevented.
SG05
Unintended acceleration must be prevented.
SG16
Anti-lock functionality must be ensured.
SG17
Unintended steering actuation must be prevented Follow Mode, Coupled Mode, Safe Halt SG03
Steering actuation beyond specification must be prevented.
SG06
Detection of driver intervention must be ensured.
SG08
Unintended slow acceleration must be prevented.
SG09
Deceleration to standstill must be ensured.
SG10
Leaving tolerance ranges must trigger operating mode change to Safe Halt.
SG11
Maximum velocity must not be exceeded.
SG12
Overrunning hard shoulder markings must be prevented.
SG13
Detection of and reaction to (deceleration to standstill) relevant obstacles (humans, vehicles, etc.) must be ensured.
SG14
Identification of leading vehicle must be ensured.
SG15
Detection of missing leading vehicle and operating mode change to safe halt must be ensured.
in the Appendix -illustrates the several iterations necessary to obtain a result commonly accepted among the contributors. For instance, safety goal SG16 was added in a later iteration, although strongly connected to safety goal SG04. Initially, the functional range was supposed to include automated unmanned operation on the motorway's right lane as well, in order to be capable of driving around obstacles on the hard shoulder. During item refinement, however, the functional range was reduced, as this feature was technically too challenging due to limited project resources. Accordingly, the unmanned operation was restricted to hard shoulders as well as acceleration and deceleration lanes, both with a limited velocity of 10 km/h (plus 2 km/h tolerance).
An example for the above mentioned safety refinement loop are safety goals SG03 and SG12. Safety goal SG12 was established in one of the first iterations effecting high ASIL ratings on all involved components, namely environment perception, AFA Logic, and actuators. In subsequent iterations, we differentiated between unintended steering actuation beyond the specification of the item definition (up to full steering actuation) and unintended steering actuation within the specification. This results in different hazardous scenarios which were rated separately. Consequently, safety goal SG03 was introduced, which targets at limiting the maximum steering angle and thereby reduces the effects of malfunctioning behavior of other system elements. Due to the limited steering angle, the AFA will intrude the right lane of the motorway with less lateral velocity. Thus, the controllability rating can be reduced as other traffic participants can react more appropriately. By this means, the limitation of the steering angle in automated operation gains the former high ASIL rating (ASIL D) of safety goal SG12 while the rating of safety goal SG12 is reduced (ASIL B).
The previous reduction of the ASIL rating of safety goal SG12 also affects the functional block of the AFA Logic, which must be implemented with ASIL B as well. In discussions prior to the project start, a group of experts from the consortium underestimated the efforts to be undertaken for implementing the AFA Logic as well as of the human machine interaction. If the operating mode is wrongly displayed, the AFA could intrude the right lane of the motorway and cause severe accidents, cf. HARA IDs 37 and 37a in the Appendix. Consequently, the correct display of the actual operating mode must be ensured (safety goal SG07, ASIL A). Both aspects illustrate the high demands on all system parts which originate from the missing human supervision. The HARA's results concerning the environment perception are of particular interest, since automated vehicles are operated in an open environment where they encounter an infinite set of operational scenarios. For the AFA, safety goals SG12 and SG13 address environment perception. While safety goal SG12 obtained an ASIL B rating, the detection and reaction to obstacles on the path are rated with QM since persons involved in the scenarios can generally control the scenarios due to the low velocity of the AFA.
As already depicted in Fig. 1 , the AFA Logic is connected to further items. Although a HARA is a top-down procedure, at some points technical aspects must be considered. In the planned system implementation of the unmanned operation, the AFA Logic has access to steering and brakes. In particular, the technical implementation of the brake system creates potential for malfunctioning behavior. Therefore, the manual operation must be considered in the HARA as well. As the malfunctioning behavior can create critical outcome in several scenarios, the related safety goals obtain highest ASIL ratings. This means that elements connected to the AFA Logic inherit according safety requirements.
IV. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
Although the functional range considered in the aFAS project is small compared to functional ranges of future automated vehicles, several implications can be derived from our experiences made. The presented HARA is primarily based on the experience and knowledge of the involved contributors from industry and academia with a range of experience from one to more than ten years. Despite the small functional range, the contributors agree on that it was challenging to take all relevant aspects into account in order to reach consistency between item definition and HARA. This reflects in the several iterations necessary to reach a common result. Using only expert knowledge might lead to missed scenarios and thus to building unsafe systems. Consequently, we expect that HARAs for systems featuring more comprehensive functional ranges must be supported by methods and tools. The approach for refining item and safety aspects described in subsection III-B appears suitable in general. However, more distinguished methods must be developed for single steps in order to gain appropriate results.
As input to the HARA process, the AFA Logic's item definition is written in natural language, supported by some tables and figures. All functionalities considered in the HARA were extracted manually. This was a process taking several iterations since functionalities had not been considered or had initially been defined contradictory. For items with a wider functional range, item definitions with a more extensive utilization of semi-formal or even formal notations are necessary for ensuring proper identification of all relevant functions and related malfunctioning behavior. Moreover, this eases traceability between item definition and HARA.
For targeting completeness of hazardous scenarios, different approaches for identifying hazards and operational scenarios can be found in literature. Comparable to the approach in the aFAS project, Johansson [9] suggests experts to challenge each single hazardous scenario. If they do not find additional scenarios that lead to new safety goals, the list is likely to be complete states Johansson. However, correct ASIL ratings are required besides completeness of safety goals. Thus, the aFAS consortium also considered ASIL ratings of hazardous scenarios with the same safety goals. Warg et al. [8] propose an identification of both hazards as well as operational scenarios based on tree structures. Out of the aFAS consortium, Bagschik et al. [10] propose an approach for deriving all relevant hazardous scenarios systematically by combining operating modes, functions (derived by skill graphs), malfunctions (derived by a HAZOP analysis), and scene discretization. However, suitability of these approaches still needs to be proven for systems of future automated vehicles in terms of considering all relevant scenarios. The first two approaches need to prove their suitability for automated vehicles with a wider functional range. In contrast, the approach of Bagschik et al. creates automatically an extensive list of scenarios. However, each scenario must be assessed manually regarding safety criticality.
Once hazardous scenarios are identified, the next challenge is determining the ASIL classification. As already mentioned, the classification for the unmanned operation of the AFA is based on expert knowledge. A few aspects of the exposure -such as the rate of emergency stopping vehicles -are justified by investigations of the aFAS consortium. Severity and controllability are purely based on experts' contribution. Furthermore, standards such as the SAE J2980 standard [11] are of limited contribution for the project aFAS since they do not consider operations on the hard shoulder and focus on vehicle motion control systems. In general, controllability of hazardous scenarios is very low for Level 4 or Level 5 applications with passengers. The controllability of hazardous scenarios without passengers -as in the project aFASis determined by surrounding traffic participants. For future application of automated vehicles, methods for objectification of the parameters must be discussed. At least, evolving standards such as the SAE J2980 standard [11] towards automated driving can support a common understanding.
So far, we conclude that methods for a systematic consideration of each HARA step can be found in literature. Consequently, one can argue that a holistic systematic HARA process is beneficial, as i. a. presented by Kemmann and Trapp [12] as well as by Beckers et al. [13] . Kemmann and Trapp [12] introduce A Structured Approach for Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessments (SAHARA), which systematically considers each HARA step. The authors consequently use model based approaches for item definition, hazard identification, as well as for classification of controllability, severity, and exposure. Beckers et al. [13] emphasize utilization of UML based notation. This ensures the traceability throughout the HARA process and enables potential for formal verification. Still, single HARA steps in the approach of Becker et al. strongly depend on expert knowledge. For both approaches, proof of applicability to automated vehicles must be furnished.
V. CONCLUSION The example of the unmanned protective vehicle reveals challenges during a HARA for automated vehicles operated without human supervision. It was demonstrated that conventional HARA approaches are of limited suitability, especially for future applications with a wider functional range. Consequently, already existing systematic approaches must be evolved towards automated driving functionalities without human supervision. For this, an in-depth consideration of each single HARA step is required. Furthermore, for merging the two worlds of automated driving and functional safety, clarification of used terminology is crucial to reach a common understanding. Table II displays the HARA developed in the project aFAS. Omitted and alphanumeric IDs reflect the iterative process of HARA development during item and safety refinement, cf. subsection III-B. Several IDs were discarded while the ID numbering was not adjusted, in order to preserve traceability between different HARA versions. [11] 
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